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The 2005 Communications Act of
Unintended Consequences
Daniel Brenner*
Communications policy has been a parade of grand themes. At the
start of the last century, universal affordable service by AT&T, the
dominant provider, became the overriding theme in telephony. It led
eventually to the demise of competition from numerous local urban
exchanges, creating a vast monopoly network and independent companies
dependent on AT&T long lines for intercity and international connections.
Broadcasters, whose issues would generate the lion's share of federal
regulatory attention for the Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC") first forty years, initially sought government intervention to
eliminate the chaos of interference supposedly ungovernable by market
forces.' Intervention arose in the form of limited-term licensing using the
standard of the public interest.2 The FCC generally defined this broad term
through compliance with content-based rules such as the fairness doctrine,
fines on offensive speech, and structural limits on local, national, and
cross-media ownership. Your experience may differ, but the greatest
moments in broadcast programming don't seem to have been connected to
these behavioral and structural efforts. Rather, artistic creativity and
editorial courage can make a difference, and government intervention may
B.A., M.A., Stanford University, J.D., Stanford Law School; Senior Vice President for
Law & Regulatory Policy, National Cable & Telecommunications Association; Adjunct
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed are the Author's own.
1. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C.Cir. 1923); United States v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ii. 1926).
2. A commentator at the time described the expression as meaning "about as little as
any phrase that the drafters of the Act could have used and still comply with the
constitutional requirement that there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom
of the licensing authority." Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or
Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 J. AIR L. 295, 296 (1930).
*
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do more harm than good in these areas.
The 1970s saw the start of a revolution in communications regulation.
Most of the new thinking can be tied to regulators addressing the demands
of new competitors. But other developments resulted from regulator
dissatisfaction with both the process and results of the earlier regimes.
These two strains are interrelated because new competitors made regulators
think hard about why rules were in place and whether their application
made any sense to newcomers. Then the regulator could consider whether
the status quo made sense, even in the absence of a competitor.
For instance, price caps, which look at the price paid by the customer
and not the rate of return earned by the provider, arose not because of
competition but because of dissatisfaction with the rate of return process. 3
Deregulation of commercial time limits and deletion of minimum
percentages of public affairs programming in radio (and later TV) resulted
from recognition that existing competition-to say nothing of new
competitors-would suffice to address market failures better than FCC
rules.
Technology was changing nearly every assumption and inducing
more competition. Long distance competitors had cheaper microwave
facilities which formed a facilities-based challenge to AT&T's high quality
but more expensive wires. Non-Bell equipment came onto the market,
lower-cost and feature-rich. The Commission tried to accommodate the
competition eventually, despite the monopolists' resistance.
Meanwhile, cable television, once a mere repeater of hard-to-receive
TV stations, began in 1975 to offer satellite-delivered networks that
competed for viewers and induced viewers with perfectly fine off-air
reception to subscribe.
To skip a whole lot of history, by the 1996 Act, Congress was
convinced more than ever that inducing competition, not perfecting
regulation, best served the public. The success of long distance and
customer-premises equipment (e.g., handsets and answering machines)
competition could, it was hoped, be extended to local telephone exchange
service. More choice and lower prices would result in the last remaining
monopoly redoubt of the residential market.
Incumbent phone companies could themselves be incipient
competitors elsewhere. The Act anticipated that competition from telco
video service could exercise a restraint on cable prices and provide service
3. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Second Report and
Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 6786 (1990) (applying price caps to local exchange carriers). "Incentive
regulation will reward companies that become more productive and efficient, while ensuring
that productivity and efficiency gains are shared with ratepayers." Id.
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competition. Congress, in 1996, partially deregulated cable prices and
4
changed the definition of effective competition. Broadcast ownership was
freed up to strengthen that industry's competitive stance.
Today, some of the results that Congress anticipated have occurred,
but the path has not been exactly as the Act foretold. Local telephone
service, the most hotly fought battleground in the Act, emerged from some
facilities competitors. But many were irrationally funded during the
Internet bubble, ran out of running room or, like Worldcom, got consumed
in the fires of corporate greed and misconduct.
The Bell incumbents fought many conclusions drawn by the FCC
about how to interpret the Act. Ambiguities in the 1996 Act became so
many shuttlecocks lobbed between the FCC and the courts, particularly the
question of when the lack of access to an element of the incumbent's
so necessary that its absence would "impair" the
5
network became
newcomer. In 2004, the Bells won the battle between themselves and
AT&T and others who relied on a combination of elements leased from the
6
incumbents at rates far below what straight resale provides. AT&T
announced it would leave the circuit-switched residential market as a
result-a few months later its acquisition was proposed by its former rival
SBC.
But competition aplenty arrived from wireless as cellular and cellularlike products like Nextel phones became must-have consumer appliances.
New providers like cable, and companies like Vonage riding on the
broadband platforms of cable and DSL, began to provide Voice over
Protocol ("VoIP")-forms of competition hardly contemplated in
Internet
7
1996.
Video competition developed sprightly as well-but not from telcos,
at least not yet. Instead, direct broadcast satellite ("DBS"), launched in
earnest in 19948 with the advent of DirecTV and joined a few years later by
DishTV, accounts for over a quarter of all homes that pay for TV service.
Telcos are again talking about entering video, this time with fiber to the

4. "Effective competition" is the term used by the Communications Act to determine
when a cable operator's rates could be completely deregulated to include telco competition.
47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(D) (2004).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2004). The elements must also be "necessary" for a
competitor to provide telecommunications service. § 251 (c)(3).
6. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
313 (2004).
7. See Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004).
8. D. Brenner et al., Cable Television and Other Nonbroadcast Video, § 15.21 (2004
ed.) (discussing DBS commercial development).
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curb or node architectures in an evolving form of VolP. But with over 85
percent of homes already subscribing to DBS or cable, and the remaining
homes likely unable or uninterested in paying for TV, telcos have a steep
hill to climb to make video a realistic business. What the telco moves may
represent is a realization that the cable platform is simply superior for the
broadband era and that it is never too late to change course and build
networks the right way.
Broadcasting? It is the best of times for some. Despite shrinking
audiences (drawn to cable channels or non-TV-based entertainment) many
networks and stations can nevertheless charge more for each minute of
advertising, year after year. When you are launching a prescription drug or
a new Chevrolet model, you need the biggest audience you can find, and
broadcasters still operate the biggest tents.
But it is the worst of times for some, too. Network compensation paid
to affiliates has shriveled or even started flowing in the opposite direction.
The National Association of Broadcasters, the most influential trade group
for decades at the FCC, finds itself without the networks (or their owned
stations) as members. Meanwhile, broadcast and cable program networks
have merged into large groups, and the historic schism between
broadcasting and cable as to program suppliers has been reduced.
The communications center of the earth increasingly is not ABC or
Verizon or T-Mobile. It is the Internet, however the customer gets there,
whether by cable modem, wi-fi, dial-up, or T-1 line at work. Whether as a
direct source of linear entertainment like eBay or a distributor of stored
material, like movie downloads, its centrifugal pull affects all the
communications businesses. Yet, except for brief mention in Sections 230
and 706 of the Act-and those sections were hardly the centerpiece of
legislative deliberations-the 1996 Act missed the Internet.
The Internet has already wreaked harm on the music business, and
motion pictures see a tornado in the distance. Free, over-the-air TV has
attempted to insure high quality programming in its digital future by
insisting that equipment suppliers and distributors like cable pass along a
broadcast flag that will 9Prevent such material from being transferred
wholesale to the Internet. Yet, the Internet is potentially a TV set with
infinite channels. Telcos fear it as a VolP end run to circuit switched
service. Cable and DBS see it as a possible middleman eliminator (even
though cable still benefits from being in the broadband connections
business-DBS, a downstream distributor, has no such luck). Cannot
wireless also expect some combination of Wi-Max (with radii of thirty
9. Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Anti-Piracy Protection for Digital TV (Nov. 4,
2003), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-240759A 1.pdf.
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miles, not 300 feet of wi-fi) and broadband VolP to also compete with
cellular service?
The lesson of the 1996 Act is that communications policy is
particularly susceptible to the law of unintended consequences. Just when
you think you can accurately forecast what adjustments to market forces
government can best make to improve policy, technology overwhelms the
assumptions and recasts the playing field.
Technology has disrupted the status quo and met with resistance
before. Incumbents, invested in older technologies, resist authorization of
newcomers. AM stifled FM in the 1940s. Hollywood movie companies
boycotted early, free TV in the 1950s. DSL was bottled up by telcos
desirous of selling customers more expensive ISDN and T- 1 service in the
1990s.
Free TV restricted cable's reach through importation restrictions and
competition through rules to prevent siphoning of popular programming. In
a Museum of Communications Regulatory Oddities, the first exhibit might
be these antisiphoning rules, struck down in 1977, which allowed cable
programmers like HBO a brief window for first-run movies and then froze
that content market for several years so that broadcast TV alone could
access it.
The rate of adoption of newer technologies, however, appears to be
increasing. FM's dominance over AM radio arrived after only decades.
TV's challenge to movie theaters did not become fully realized until the
advent of home video over thirty years later; theatrical exhibition is, as a
matter of film revenues, the tail that wags the home video dog. Satellite
networks on cable TV, first introduced in the mid-1970s, did not become a
significant ratings competitor to broadcasting until the 1980s. On the other
hand, deployment of broadband internet access occurred nationally in less
than a decade (although adoption rates are not quite as rapid). Wireless
phone substitution, particularly among younger customers, appears to be
much faster than a twenty-year cycle.
So far, the new technologies have generally been additions, not
replacements. AM still dominates sports radio. Movie theaters keep
reinventing the experience: fifty years ago theaters gave away free gravy
boats on weeknights; twenty-five years ago theater owners introduced
surround-sound; now theaters offer stadium seating, cupholders, and
nineteen screens as the latest lures.
But technologies do go away. The per-minute long distance chargeitself largely a noncost-based invention of AT&T to subsidize low cost
10. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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universal local service-may go the way of the telegram or telex. Musical
audiocassettes (and the iconic 8-track) are nearly gone. Laser discs, early
picture phones, C-band satellite dishes-are almost no more.
In approaching a communications legislative process, then, it is good
to remember how little success the 104th Congress had in predicting
communications futures.
What does work? Undoing unnecessary regulation will often prove
the test of time, such as the 1993 deregulation of mobile services.11 Or take
the 1996 deregulation of upper tier cable rates. Done with the expectation
that incumbent telcos would enter video via cable franchises, cable
convinced investors to finance an $86 billion rebuild of the nation's cable
systems.
The initial motivation was to upgrade channel capacity to provide a
product competitive with the 100-plus channels offered by DBS. But the
rebuild also permitted sufficient upstream quality and capacity to launch
cable modem service, redundancy to reduce outages, and system
reconfiguration (accompanied by regional consolidation) to reduce the
number of headends necessary to provide service. This restructuring of the
industry led to greater competition from an otherwise fractured cable
competitor in local and regional advertising. It produced the greatest
success story of the 1996 Act, residential broadband cable modem service
and it induced competition from the telcos' DSL.
In contrast, new regulatory ideas did not fare so well. The 1996 Act's
complicated yet ambiguous blueprint to generate local phone competition
did not quite work. For instance, the Act's explicit resale requirements 12
led to little new entry (despite the success of resale as a competitive
strategy in the early days of cellular). Millions of customers did switch to
competitors who created a platform using the more deeply discounted
unbundled network element-platform ("UNE-P"), but that arrangement
proved unsustainable. The future of lasting, local, substantial phone
competition may depend on VoIP, a form of competition not addressed by
the Act. Likewise, the comprehensive scheme for open video systems
created by the Act 13 has had little impact on the video services market.
The 1992 Cable Act had some interesting misfires as well. One could
credibly argue that the retransmission consent scheme, which allows a
broadcaster to withhold its signal from a cable (or, as added later, DBS)
operator has strengthened only broadcasters who have had a cable-related
program service with which to negotiate (or take price controls). Even the
11. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (2004).
12. Id.; § 251(c)(4) (2004).
13. § 573 (2004).
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most fervent 1992 Act advocates have not called for return of the Act's rate
regulation scheme, which managed to damage cable programmers and
operators and probably retard introduction of residential broadband
deployment by half a decade while actually reducing consumer welfare in
video programming.
The point here is not especially original; legislatures sometimes get it
terribly wrong. That is as true for communications law as elsewhere. But
where technology has a staggering capacity to quickly undo legislators'
vision of the competitive landscape, any regulatory fixes that depend on the
accuracy of that vision merit a healthy, but not lethal, dose of skepticism.
Much of the focus of the coming legislative season (and who knows
how many in the future) will be on telephone company cost recovery:
whether directly collected in subscriber monthly payments, or indirectly
collected through universal service support payments or compensation paid
when exchanging, originating, or terminating telephone calls for another
carrier. The urgency of this matter will likely take precedence over other
issues.
The cost recovery knot has remained tied for years, despite recent
efforts by industry groups to address it. A pure market approach would
mean that a rural phone customer more directly pays the costs of service. It
is believed that such a monthly bill would lead to disconnecting large
number of Americans. 14 So there is going to be some fix, either by
Congress or the FCC, especially as VoIP and other newer communications
services come online or take share away from traditional contributors.
Beyond those items that must get fixed, however, it is not clear on
what Congress should focus with respect to each regulated industry---cable
included. Surely each has a wish list, and industry critics have theirs too.
As each industry seeks its fair advantage in the process, it is hard to believe
that a very coherent, shared communications vision would emerge.
That is why a general rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934 and
1996 should be approached with trepidation. Will the country really benefit
by a fresh version of ambiguous congressional guidance to the FCC, borne
of legislative compromises, as was the case in 1996? Some might say the
third time is the charm. Others might conclude that the alternative seen in
the UNE-P wars-from the FCC, to court, and back to the FCC-has not
been any better. Congress, not the FCC even as aided by the courts, is
assigned by the Constitution to make laws.
14. "[A Senator's telecommunications aide] recently noted that a dial tone in Eskimo
villages in Alaska would cost $900 without support from [universal service]." Terry Lane,
Telecom Act Reform Only Partof Upcoming CongressionalAgenda, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 2,
2004.
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The hurdle to enacting communications legislation should be high and
the aim of the legislation should be targeted. Specifically, and in
conclusion, the Author offers a little four-part test. One, legislation should
do as little damage as possible to market forces that actually produce the
benefits of the communications revolution both here and abroad. Two,
legislation should require the predicate of demonstrated market failure.
Three, advocates should be confident that the solution will do less damage
than the failure has produced. Four, even then, legislation should not try to
cabin the forces of technology that will inevitably find a way free anyway.

